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Nearly 100 years ago Fletcher Moulton LJ stated “Iam satisfied that few of those who insure have anyidea how completely they leave themselves in the
hands of the insurers should the latter wish to dispute the
policy when it falls in” in Joel v Law Union and Crown
Insurance Company [1908] 2 KB 863 at p885. His criticism
has been repeated on many occasions by others, including
for example Staughton LJ who recently stated as follows in
Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyd’s Rep IR
154 at p157:
“Avoidance for non disclosure is a drastic remedy. It enables
the insurer to disclaim liability after, and not before, he has
discovered that the risk turns out to be a bad one; it leaves
the insured without the protection which he thought he had
contracted and paid for. Of course, there are occasions where a
dishonest insured meets his just deserts if his insurance is
avoided; and the insurer is justly relieved of liability. I do not
say that non-disclosure operates only in cases of dishonesty.
But I do consider that there should be some restraint in the
operation of the doctrine. Avoidance for honest non-disclosure
should be confined to plain cases.”
The general complaint is that the insurer who wishes to
avoid a policy for non-disclosure is in a very strong
position given his right to treat the policy as void from the
outset. This article examines the legal position and puts
forward a suggestion for reform that might lead to a more
balanced and fair position between insurer and insured.
THE PRESENT POSITION IN LAW
Judicial expressions such as the two set out above of
concern relating to the onerous duties of disclosure
imposed on proposers of insurance policies and to the
draconian consequences of falling short of the
requirements of those duties are not hard to find. The
broad topic of non-disclosure in insurance law has already
been considered by distinguished lawyers in the context of
reform (namely by committees chaired by Devlin J and by
Kerr J) but their recommendations have not been
implemented.
The following two settled principles apply in this
context. Firstly, the proposer is under a duty at the time of
making (or renewing) a policy to disclose to the insurer all
material information affecting the risk to be insured.
Secondly, the (usual) remedy for non-disclosure is
rescission ab initio of the policy at the behest of the insurer.
Any doubt that there might have been that rescission ab
initio of an insurance policy for non-disclosure operated by
act of the party rather than order of the Court was firmly
removed by the Court of Appeal in Brotherton v Aseguradora
Colseguros SA (No 2) [2003] Lloyd’s Rep IR 746 (see
judgment of Mance LJ at par 27). Thus, the insurer does
not need to obtain an order of the Court before being
entitled to treat the policy as void – all he needs to do is to
tell the insured that the policy is being avoided for non-
disclosure.
The scope of the duty can be problematic in practice.
Materiality is tested by reference to the prudent insurer.
Section 18(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 states that
“every circumstance is material which would influence the
judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or
determining whether he will take the risk.” In Lambert v Co-
operative Insurance Society Limited [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 485
Mackenna J giving the leading judgment in the Court of
Appeal confirmed that the same test of materiality applied
to non-marine insurance (pp488-89). In theory at least,
this is an objective test based on what would influence the
judgment of the prudent insurer at the time of placing. The
proposer is therefore required to disclose matters which he
might perfectly genuinely believe would not be of interest
to insurers, the problem being particularly acute if the
proposer is insuring in a private capacity and has little idea
of what the prudent insurer might consider material. This
problem is neatly illustrated by the following passage from
the judgment of Forbes J in Reynolds v Phoenix Assurance Co
Ltd [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 440 at p457, col2:10
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“Now to adopt the objective insurer test and reject the
objective proposer is to pose this problem; it follows that any
proposer is bound to disclose that which no reasonable
proposer would regard as material. As a difficulty this was
referred to both by the Law Reform Committee and by the
Court of Appeal in Lambert’s case. In the course of the trial I
wondered whether the problem was rather a theoretical one
than a practical one and the answer to the problem was that
no reasonable insurer would require disclosure unless it was of
something which a reasonable proposer would in fact realise
was material. I accordingly canvassed this possibility with
some of the insurance witnesses. In the event only one of them
was prepared to accept this suggestion; the others to whom I
put the point rejected it.”
However, good faith on the part of the proposer in not
disclosing matters which the prudent insurer would
consider material, and the fact that the reasonable
proposer would not appreciate materiality, are not valid
defences.
Further, the degree of materiality required assists
insurers at the expense of insureds. In Pan Atlantic Ins Co Ltd
v Pine Top Ins Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501 Lord Mustill (with
whom Lord Goff and Lord Slynn agreed) made two points.
Firstly, the relevant common law principles were mirrored
in the provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.
Secondly, the words “influence the judgment of a prudent
underwriter” in s18(2) of that Act did not require decisive
influence, and had such a requirement been intended the
word “influence” would have been qualified in the Act: an
influence, even if not decisive, was sufficient – p531. The
duty extended to “all matters which would have been taken
into account by the underwriter when assessing the risk” –
p538. Thus, “a circumstance may be material even though
a full and accurate disclosure of it would not in itself have
had a decisive effect on the prudent underwriter’s decision
whether to accept the risk and if so at what premium” –
p550.
Thus the proposer is obliged to disclose matters which
even if disclosed might have led to the insurer agreeing to
insure on identical terms, though some alleviation is
provided by the inducement requirement considered
below.
Where an insured is found to have committed material
non-disclosure, the insurer has the right to avoid the policy
if he so wishes. The effect of this is rescission ab initio of
the policy, and though the insured will be refunded his
premium, he cannot compel the insurer to continue the
policy (even on different terms). A particularly harsh
example of this is provided by the facts of Mackay v London
General Insurance Company Ltd (1935) 51 Ll L Rep 201. To
the question of “Has any office or underwriter refused,
cancelled or declined to accept or renew such insurance, or
required an increased premium or special condition?” the
insured answered “No”, but in fact when 18 he had
obtained motorcycle insurance subject to a £2 10s excess.
To the question of “Have you or your driver ever been
convicted or had a motor licence indorsed?” he answered
“No” when in fact he had been fined 10s several years
before because a nut on the brakes of his motorcycle had
become loose. Swift J expressed in poignant terms his
considerable regret in confirming the insurer’s right to
avoid the policy (at p202).
However, since Pan Atlantic, it has been clear that “if the
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a material fact did
not in fact induce the making of the contract (in the sense
in which that expression is used in the general law of
misrepresentation) the underwriter is not entitled to rely
on it as a ground for avoiding the contract” – per Lord
Mustill at p550. Thus the insurer must show that he was
induced to write the insurance policy as a result of the non-
disclosure. Whilst this seems to offer a sort of safeguard for
the insured, unfortunately the insurer will seldom have
significant difficulty with this point. Firstly, as pointed out
by Halsbury, there may be some cases where “materiality is
so obvious” (Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th edition),
volume 31, para1067). But even where this is not the case,
the insurer will in the majority of cases be able to provide
evidence of inducement either from the underwriter in
question, or possibly evidence of market practice from
which inducement can be inferred, either of which an
insured would find difficult to rebut.
As can be seen then, the position in law relating to an
insurer’s right to avoid for non-disclosure does appear to
be stacked somewhat disproportionately in favour of the
insurer at the expense of the insured.
PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REFORM
Non-disclosure in insurance law was considered in the
Fifth Report of the Law Reform Committee (under the
chairmanship of Devlin J) (1957) Cmnd 62 and (following
a consultation paper) in a Report entitled Insurance Law:
Non-Disclosure and Breaches of Warranty (under the
chairmanship of Kerr J) (1980) Cmnd 8064. Additionally,
in 1979 the European Commission proposed a Directive
dealing with, inter alia, questions of disclosure in insurance
law: the Kerr Committee rejected its implementation; and
it does not appear that it will be enacted (at least in its
present form).
So far as presently material, the Kerr Committee stated
as follows. Firstly, the “proportionality” principle
embodied in the draft EC Directive (that the insured
should pay out only a proportion of the claim, determined
by the ratio of the premium charged and the premium that
would have been charged but for the non-disclosure) was
problematic (paras 4.5 – 4.17). This was largely because
the insurer could have reacted to the undisclosed facts in
ways other than increasing the premium (para 4.5) and in
particular, may have refused to insure the risk at all (para
4.6). Secondly, “The total abolition of any duty of 11





disclosure would be undesirable and impractical” (para
4.32), even for consumers (para 4.35 et seq). Even an
attenuation of the duty in relation to customers would
“lead to anomalous results in practice” (para 4.42).
Thirdly, the duty of disclosure should extend to facts that
would influence a prudent insurer decisively (cf Pan
Atlantic), that the insured had actual or constructive
knowledge of, and that a reasonable insured in the position
of the insured would have disclosed (paras 4.47 – 4.53).
Finally, as regards any restricting of insurers’ rights of
avoidance, a “nexus test”, requiring a connection between
the non-disclosure complained of and the loss suffered,
was misconceived, primarily because where there was no
“nexus” insurers would be bound by contracts whose
terms would have been different but for the non-disclosure
(paras 4.89 – 4.97). Whilst a judicial discretion to reduce
the insured’s entitlement might give flexibility, it would
lead to uncertainty and excessive litigation, and ultimately
would do more harm than good (paras 4.98 – 4.108).
Whilst the approach of the Kerr Committee is generally
sound, it is respectfully submitted that it is particularly
problematic in one respect. The committee recommended
that the duty to disclose should only extend to matters
which a reasonable insured in the position of the insured
would have disclosed. Yet in a great many cases, even a
reasonable insured would not have disclosed matters that
an insurer would have considered very pertinent, perhaps
so pertinent that the insurer would have refused cover. This
is the very problem that Forbes J alluded to in Reynolds v
Phoenix Assurance Co Ltd in the passage set out above. The
approach of the Kerr Committee risks, it is submitted,
placing the law of non-disclosure too much in favour of the
insured, because the insurer would in many cases be bound
to terms other than those he would have agreed but for the
non-disclosure.
This point brings into sharp focus the nub of the present
problem – the tension between holding parties to be
bound by freely entered into agreements, and providing a
remedy where consent to the agreement can be said to be
vitiated in some way. The insurer is either bound to terms
less onerous on the insured than would have been the case
but for the non-disclosure (Kerr Committee approach), or
the insurer can escape from terms freely entered into by
reason of a trivial non-disclosure by the insured (present
law).
The present writer certainly agrees with the Kerr
Committee that the principle of non-disclosure performs a
valuable commercial function and should not be abolished.
A more satisfactory answer than the all or nothing effect of
both the present law and the Kerr Committee
recommendation may well lie elsewhere. A more
principled approach would be to focus not on holding
parties to be bound to freely entered into agreements and
not bound where consent can be said to be vitiated, but
rather holding them to be bound by the terms that would
have been agreed but for the non-disclosure.
REFORM: THE STATUTORY
ANTI-AVOIDANCE CLAUSE
The validity of the anti-avoidance clause in insurance law
is now beyond doubt. In Toomey v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd
(No 2) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 88, Colman J accepted, in the
light of previous authority, that “it is indeed possible to
write a clause into a contract which does in fact exclude the
right to rescind the contract for material misrepresentation
or material non-disclosure.” The conceptual difficulty
relied upon by the insurer in that case was that non-
disclosure would permit rescission of the very contract in
which the clause restricting the right to rescind appeared,
so it would be a bootstraps argument for the insured to
attempt to rely upon such a clause. However, Colman J,
noting that there was authority on this point, took the
contrary view.
The insurer’s right to avoid is enshrined in section 17 of
the Marine Insurance Act 1906. It is the proposal of the
present writer that the solution to the problem considered
above would be for a statute to be enacted implying a
suitable anti-avoidance clause into all contracts of
insurance. This would probably require at least substantial
amendment, if not repeal of section 17. Some would say
that such a step would be long overdue, and any new
insurance legislation effecting the proposed reform could
easily deal with this.
At first glance, it might appear that such a proposal
would have an effect as rigid as the Kerr Committee
recommendation. However, the following features are also
proposed. First, the insurer should be able to avoid the
policy where he can prove either that the insured has
committed fraud or that he would not have entered into a
policy on any terms if the undisclosed facts had been
disclosed. The justification for the former is self-evident.
As for the latter, it is suggested that it would be wrong in
principle to compel insurers to abide by policies that they
can prove they would not have entered into on any terms.
Second, if the insurer can prove that he would have entered
the policy on different terms, such as an increased
premium, a higher excess or deductible, or different terms
of cover, then the policy should be retrospectively varied to
reflect those terms.
It is acknowledged that the second of the above features
might give rise to practical difficulties in evidential terms.
A higher premium or excess is relatively easy
retrospectively to deal with, but it may be that the insurer
can prove, for example, that he would have reinsured a
proportion of the risk. However, the above proposal has
the advantage that if the insurer can prove that he would
have reinsured, say, half the risk, then the insured could
still compel the insurer in effect to pay out half the claim.
When compared to the present all or nothing approach,12
Amicus Curiae Issue 64 March/April 2006
this is surely preferable, and moreover such an approach
would bring home to proposers the continuing need to
make full disclosure of material facts notwithstanding the
statutory anti-avoidance clause. At the same time, this
approach would have the effect of holding the parties to
the bargain that they would have made but for the non-
disclosure (in particular, it would stop insurers rejecting
largely meritorious claims for the most trivial of non-
disclosures), which as a matter of principle is, it is
submitted, sound.
This approach would be more sophisticated than the
proportionality approach criticised by the Kerr
Committee, and preferable to that approach: it should be
remembered that the proportionality approach focuses
simply on the increased premium that the insured would
hypothetically have charged (or perhaps the increased
excess that would have been imposed) had the non-
disclosure not occurred (see also for instance Insurance Law
Update, Roger Kay, (2005) 26 BLR (6) 153 at p154
suggesting that the insured should be allowed to recover
“with an adjustment to reflect the premium that should
have been paid to reflect the increased risk”).
The suggested approach allows the insurer the
opportunity to prove to the court (and the burden should
be on the insurer) not only that he would not have entered
into the insurance on any terms at all, but alternatively that
he would have required a higher excess or would have
imposed other special conditions (which may have led to
the event which occurred giving rise to the claim not being
within the scope of the cover), as well as requiring a higher
premium. The crucial point is that the insurer might, by
proving that he would have imposed other special
conditions or insured on different terms, be able to avoid
paying out on a particular claim (which would not be
covered under the different terms), but would not be able
to avoid the insurance policy as a whole, thereby preserving
the right of the insured to put forward other claims and
succeed where the non-disclosure has made no difference
because those claims would have been covered under
either set of terms. The insurer may well find it
straightforward to prove that he would have insured with a
higher premium, and the insured will find it difficult to
adduce evidence in rebuttal, but the insured will surely
prefer this to the policy being avoided ab initio. The Court
would no doubt be vigilant in carefully scrutinizing claims
that the insurer would have insured on different terms
which would have happened to exclude the loss claimed on
a particular occasion, and this should provide a safeguard
against insurers speculatively taking this point as a matter
of routine.
Although the suggested approach is admittedly a little
artificial, it is nevertheless a fair and principled balance
between all or nothing approaches which arguably are
more artificial. The starting point should always be that
(fraud aside) the insurer is by statute prohibited from
avoiding the policy ab initio by virtue of a statutory implied
term to that effect which cannot be contracted out of.
This proposal is similar to the 25th recommendation in
the Australian Law Reform Commission’s Review of the
Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Report 92 of April 2001)
which would preserve the right to avoid for fraudulent
non-disclosure (with no return of premium) and insert
considerations of proportion in other cases. However, that
recommendation still would not deal with matters other
than the financial ones of different premium, deductible or
excess that would have been imposed, such as different
conditions of cover. The proposal suggested is more
flexible that this, as set out above. It is acknowledged that
reform along the lines suggested in this article would no
doubt lead to a modest increase in premiums across the
board, but this is surely preferable to the present state of
affairs which enables insurers to avoid policies for the most
trivial and innocent of non-disclosures.
A word should perhaps be said about the need for
legislative reform at all. So far as private insurance is
concerned, the Statement on General Insurance Practice
(“the Statement”) and the Statement on Long-Term
Insurance Practice issued by the Association of British
Insurers and Lloyd’s constitute a voluntary code governing
relations between insurers and insureds. Until very
recently, these statements lacked legal effect, but the
former has in some part now been given regulatory force
by the Insurance Conduct of Business Rules (“the Rules”)
made by the Financial Services Authority pursuant to its
powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act
2000. The Rules came into force in January 2005. The
Statement and now the Rules provide, so far as presently
material, that insurers should not insist upon enforcement
of their strict legal rights against consumers in cases of inter
alia non-disclosure (see in particular Rule 7.3.6).
It is submitted that the Kerr Committee’s opinion (of
what was then the Statement) is apt. As well as stating, as
set out above, that there should in principle be no
difference in approach to “consumer” and “non-
consumer” insurance, the Kerr Committee stated that “the
Statements of Insurance Practice are themselves evidence
that the law is unsatisfactory and needs to be changed…
[they] lack the force of law so that an insured would have
no legal remedy if an insurer fails to act in accordance with
them” (para 3.28). A similar view was taken by the learned
editors of MacGillivray on Insurance Law (9th edition, 1997)
at paragraph 17.100 – “we do not regard these statements
of self-regulatory practice as a substitute for reform of the
law”. The 10th edition of that same work (2003) states the
same at paragraph 17.104, though it has not been updated
to take account of the coming into force of the Rules in
January 2005.
Although now the Statement and the Rule have the force
of law, the cogent criticism remains that there is no reason
in principle to limit the insurer’s right to avoid for non- 13





disclosure only to the consumer insurance field (albeit that
the effects will no doubt be felt mostly harshly by such
insureds). As early as 1975 Lawton LJ in Lambert v Co-
operative Insurance Society stated: “Such injustices as there are
must now be dealt with by Parliament, if they are to be got
rid of at all.” [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 485 at p492, quoted
with approval by the Kerr Committee (paragraph 3.28).
The Rules go some way towards addressing the problem,
but wholesale reform along the lines suggested in this
article would, it is respectfully suggested, be a more
satisfactory way of approaching the problem.
Reform is, it would appear, now on the horizon. In
January 2006 the Law Commission and the Scottish Law
Commission published a Joint Scoping Paper inviting
suggestions as to which areas (in addition to non-disclosure
and breach of warranty) should be considered in a
consultation paper on insurance contract law. At paragraph
1.9 the Scoping Paper states as follows: “We do not accept
the arguments of one consultee who suggested that
extensive rules from the Financial Services Authority
(“FSA”) and the mechanisms for change already in place
were an adequate substitute for review of the law.” At
paragraphs 1.14 to 1.25 the Scoping Paper convincingly
sets out why certain points made by those against reform
are weak points, and at paragraph A4 of Appendix A the
Scoping Paper sets out some of the concerns the Law
Commissions have about the present law of non-
disclosure. At paragraph 1.6 the Scoping Paper refers to
the influence of the Insurance Contract Law Reform
Report of the British Insurance Law Association
(September 2002) in the decision to consider reform in
this area. That report stated at paragraph 11 as follows:
“We agree whole-heartedly with the Commission that
Statements of Practice, particularly limited to those insuring
in their private capacity, are not sufficient to protect insureds.
Nor do we think that the fact that the Ombudsman is bound
to act in accordance with what is fair and reasonable and
therefore does not always apply the strict letter of the law,
removes the need for law reform. Many disputes are not settled
by that route. The appropriate course is to remove unfairness
in the law, not simply to alleviate the unfairness.”
At paragraph 17.3.4 the BILA recommended a solution
“on the lines of Recommendation 25 of the ALRC”, but
that recommendation is based on the principle of
proportionality, which as set out above is limited to
financial considerations. It is thus clear that there is a case
for law reform as regards non-disclosure in insurance law,
and that at long last progress might shortly be made in this
area. It is suggested that the option set out in this article,
wider than the proportionality principle which many have
advocated before, is an option that the Law Commissions
might like to consider in their consultation paper to be
produced in due course.
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